In my opening comments during the conference "The Everyday Life of Islam: Focus on Islam in China," held at Cornell University on April 27 and 28, 2012, I proposed a number of themes, tensions, and conflicts on which we might focus our discussion of the papers. This epilogue will summarize some of the conversations that ensued and note areas of particular interest that emerged from revisions to the five essays presented in this special issue of Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review.
Muslims (that is, how to act like a Hui, Uyghur, etc.). In the People's Republic of China (PRC) these distinctions engage the separation between zongjiao and minzu, a conceptual differentiation so crucial to the state that two separate government bureaucracies have been created to deal with its two sides. Reifying a discursive practice over a century old, the PRC has organized the society it governs into discrete, unquestionable groupings called minzu, formerly anglicized as "minority nationalities" but now officially translated as "ethnic groups."
3
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Minzu Commission of the PRC government identified precisely fifty-six "minority minzu" within its borders, theoretically based on criteria developed by Stalin in the 1920s and on the "avowedly scientific scale of material stages of social process (derived from Morgan and Engels, refined by Lenin and Stalin)" (Harrell 1995, 9) . No one in the PRC can question the facticity of these minzu entities, despite the political, subjective, local, sometimes cursory process of their identification or, more accurately, "differentiation" (Ch.
shibie)-a process that included both observation and creation. No one, inside or outside the PRC, can doubt the draconian power of the institutions that have perpetuated and strengthened the state-recognized minzu since then while denying the existence of any others.
4
While religious affiliation and practice remain more or less voluntary in the PRC, membership in a minzu is held to be genetic, biological, and therefore (in theory) necessary and determined. 5 Every citizen has a minzu designation on the officially issued identity card necessary for access to many government services or even to physical mobility. Ten of the officially designated minzu are called "Muslim," meaning that their members' ancestors were Tension has been constant, and sometimes violent, between the strictly delimited partystate definition and the much more capacious and broadly mandated notions of shari'a prevalent elsewhere in the Muslim world. The Ramadan fast, for example, one of the most crucial religious obligations of Muslims, has sometimes been allowed by the party-state, sometimes forbidden, and usually ridiculed in state discourse as "unscientific" and dangerous to Muslims' health.
Erie's narrative demonstrates that even private religious duties have become part of a statedominated discourse that defines Islam as entirely compatible with the party-state's demands for harmony and unity (which some parse as "homogeneity"), rationalism, and social stability.
Rian Thum's detailed study of Turki documents presents a much less common perspective-that of culturally non-Chinese Muslims, living in what is now part of China, for whom "China" remained only a distant, hazy other. Examining the vocabulary of reference to their eastern neighbor, Thum's Altishahri informants call into question the most basic terms of our conference, "Islam" and "China," demonstrating the greater salience of the former, encompassing not only Altishahr but the entire Turko-Persian world to its west, even under indirect Qing rule. How does the state or religion appear to people for whom China might be a distant oasis city rather than an empire or culture area, and its ruler a khan rather than a huangdi?
This unfamiliar perspective can undermine our habitual reference to "China" as something assumed, solid, and obviously central. What can we say about a more extreme example of Muslim diversity-a member of the Hui minzu and thus, by genealogical definition, a Muslim, who has joined the Chinese Communist Party and thus publicly accepted atheism, never goes to a mosque or prays, and eats pork and drinks alcohol with his non-Hui colleagues in order to fit in? 12 Finally, can the study of Islamic communities and their texts even call into question the nature of the "China" they supposedly inhabit?
Both our collection of scholars in Ithaca, New York, and our diverse informants must deal with these and many more definitional questions.
Modernity and Religion
The place of Muslims (however defined) in modern China, and of Chinese Muslims in the modern world, received considerable attention from the conference participants. Modernity dilemmas, some of them common to all religions and believers, have been particularly acute in China, where modernity arrived-at least in the conventional story-borne by aggressive, amoral, greedy imperialists. The "China" they invaded, the Qing Empire, was deeply mired in "feudal" and corrupt politics, which are generally blamed on the Empress Dowager and the Qing elite she led. Like all subjects of that empire, Muslims had to adapt to the traumatic presence of the overwhelmingly powerful foreigners, bearing their alien weapons, goods, sociopolitical structures, and beliefs. In response, Chinese nationalists, including many Muslims, advocated a strong, centralized, militarily and economically powerful state to defend China, defined as the entire territory of the former Qing Empire, including all of Xinjiang and Tibet, against foreign aggression. Thum's nineteenth-and early twentieth-century manuscripts, of course, saw the Qing and the Chinese Republic as the outside aggressors, flying directly in the face of Chinese nationalism and branding it as foreign. Given this conflicted history and its diverse impacts on different communities and regions, Muslims in China can no more agree on what "modern" ought to mean than they can on a homogeneous vision of Islam.
The Heterogeneity of Authenticity
Given their rich ethnographic and historical detail, it would be impossible to summarize these papers in a few terse themes. All the essays, however, reflect the wide variety of "ways of being Muslim (or Hui or Uyghur or Turki)" in the People's Republic of China and its ancestor states. That multiplicity itself presents an epilogue writer with an obvious conclusion-namely that our informants themselves, whether individuals or texts, cannot define a single, invariable, As always when we study China's vast, highly differentiated spaces and convoluted modern histories, we must attend carefully to context, both geographical and chronological. That is, we cannot define being Muslim, being Hui, or being Uyghur (or Turki) in univocal, static, stereotypical, or doctrinaire terms without violating the realities of historical or contemporary China. This should not surprise anyone familiar with religious history anywhereincluding that of Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, or Islam-or with ethnography and ethnohistory. Large-scale definitions, attractive or useful though they may be, invariably break down in the face of detailed, local, careful understanding. We owe many thanks to the organizers and participants in the Cornell conference for advancing the specificity, complexity, and diversity of our knowledge of everyday life and everyday Islam among Muslims in China.
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As the conventional Chinese proverb had it, "The sky is high, and the emperor is far away." 2 For the Qing, see Lipman (2006) . For the Republican period, see Mao (forthcoming). 3 I shall leave the term minzu untranslated, to emphasize its difference from any English equivalent. In the twentieth century, it clearly derives from the Japanese minzoku (K. minjok), a kanji term chosen in the 1870s as a translation for European words such as Fr. la nation, Ger. das Volk, and Eng. nation, a concept without an obvious East Asian equivalent until then. 4
For a meticulously documented history of the "nationality differentiation project" (C. minzu shibie), see Mullaney (2010) . 5
Children of "mixed marriages"-with parents in two different minzu-have either been registered automatically in the minzu of their fathers or allowed to choose between the two when they reach adulthood. Some hundreds of thousands of PRC citizens do not belong to a recognized minzu; in the relevant census data, they are listed as "other" (C. qita). 6
As she writes, "By consuming international Islamic literature and media, Shadian Muslims imagine a religious past, present, and future that temporally and spatially incorporates the umma as an entirety and marks them as members of that umma" (Turnbull, this issue, p. 52). 7
In Turnbull's words, "authentic identity for Kunming Hui precluded religious practice: because a solid ethnic pedigree could absolve a person of the religious obligation to Common throughout the Muslim umma, these accusations are often characterized as "Wahhabi" or "fundamentalist" and considered to be an unavoidable part of Islam's adaptation (like that of many religions) to the modern world. 12
During my fieldwork in northwest China, I heard a Chinese proverb about Hui flexibility-"One Hui is no Hui, only two Hui are Hui"-meaning that a Hui alone will drink alcohol or eat pork, but will not if another Hui is present to observe his transgression.
